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Abstract
The paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which
each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different
intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show
that every equilibrium is either “reciprocal” or “non-reciprocal”. In
a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest equally in the link
between them. In a non-reciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned
into “concentrated” and “diversified” agents and a concentrated agent
is only linked to diversified agents and vice versa. For every link, the
concentrated agent invests more in the link than the diversified agent.
The unweighted relationship graph of an equilibrium, in which two
agents are linked if they both invest positively in each other, uniquely
predicts the equilibrium values of each agent’s network investment
and utility level, as well as the ratio of any two agents’ investments in
each other. We show that equilibria are not pairwise stable and not
efficient due to the positive externalities of investing in a link.
Keywords weighted networks, network formation, link-specific in-
vestment
JEL Classification Codes D85, L14, Z13, C72
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1 Introduction
A network is a graph which describes the relations between the network’s
members. A link between two members of a network can represent, for
example, friendship, co-authorship, trade or communication between them.
Most of the literature on network formation, following the seminal papers
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000), assumes that
an agent decides whether or not to form a link, but does not determine its
intensity. However, in many situations agents must choose not only with
whom to interact but also the intensity of that interaction.
We analyze a symmetric game in which each agent has a limited resource
that she can keep for herself (self-investment) and invest in forming links
with other agents. A strategy of an agent specifies an allocation of her
resource across all agents (including herself). We say that two agents are
linked if they both invest positively in each other. An agent’s utility is the
sum of her benefits from self-investment and from each of her relationships.
The benefit from self-investment is represented by an increasing and strictly
concave function. The benefit from her relationship with another agent is
increasing and strictly concave in the two agents’ investments in each other
and is represented by a function which exhibits strategic complementarity
and is homogenous of degree one.
In the main analysis, we investigate the game’s Nash equilibria. Special
attention is devoted to the (unweighted and undirected) relationship graphs
which are induced by equilibria and which include a link between two agents
if they both invest positively in each other.
We show that every equilibrium is of one of two types: reciprocal or
non-reciprocal. In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two linked agents invest the
same amount in the link between them, and all agents choose the same self-
investment and derive the same utility. Using a result from graph theory,
we characterize the full set of relationship graphs associated with reciprocal
equilibria. This set includes, for example, graphs in which every agent is
linked to more than half of the other agents, or in which every agent has the
same number of links. The set excludes, for example, graphs in which there
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is an agent with only one link. It is possible that two agents have a different
number of links and that an agent has links of varying intensities.
In a non-reciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned into two sets: the
set of concentrated agents and the set of diversified agents. Links only exist
across the sets and never within a set. For all links, the concentrated agent
invests more in the link than the diversified agent. The ratio between the
investment of a concentrated agent and that of a diversified agent in their
link is the same across all links (and denoted by qt). All concentrated agents
choose the same level of self-investment which is higher than the level of self-
investment chosen by all diversified agents. Diversified agents derive greater
utility than concentrated agents. The ratio of the number of concentrated
agents to the number of diversified agents is positively correlated with qt.
We show that the relationship graphs of reciprocal and non-reciprocal
equilibria are entirely distinct. Thus, only knowing the equilibrium relation-
ship graph is sufficient to determine whether the equilibrium is reciprocal or
non-reciprocal. Furthermore, the relationship graph of a non-reciprocal equi-
librium uniquely determines the partition into concentrated and diversified
agents, the value of qt, and each agent’s level of self-investment and utility.
However, the relationship graph does not always pin down the equilibrium
investments in a link. We demonstrate that many equilibria with different
levels of investment in links can induce the same relationship graph.
We examine the comparative statics of equilibria when relationships be-
come more valuable relative to self-investment and when each agent’s resource
endowment increases. In view of the multiplicity of equilibria, we restrict
ourselves to investigate how the equilibrium values which are uniquely deter-
mined by the relationship graph and the model parameters change when the
corresponding model parameter is varied and the relationship graph is held
fixed.
Additionally, we show that equilibria are not stable against pairwise de-
viations and are not efficient, in the sense that they do not maximize the
sum of agents’ utilities. This is due to the positive externality of an agent’s
investment in a link that benefits the other agent in the link. We characterize
efficient networks and find that in an efficient network, any two agents invest
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the same amount in each other, but choose a lower self-investment than in
a reciprocal equilibrium. We show that nevertheless the set of relationship
graphs of efficient networks coincides with the set of relationship graphs of
reciprocal equilibria.
Related literature. This paper adds to the literature on network for-
mation with weighted links.
The most closely related articles are Salonen (2015), Griffith (2017), and
Brueckner (2006) which analyze the formation of weighted social networks,
and Goyal et al. (2008) which analyze a two-stage game in which firms first
form weighted links in R&D networks and then compete in a market. These
authors focus on symmetric equilibria. Restricting the analysis in this way
limits the possibility of differences in link intensities in equilibrium. We
extend to beyond symmetric equilibria and identify asymmetric equilibrium
structures.
Bloch and Dutta (2009) and Dero¨ıan (2009) analyze the formation of com-
munication networks, in which agents also derive utility from indirect links,
with budget constraints and without self-investment. Thus, the amount in-
vested in the network is determined exogenously and is the same for all
agents. The possibility of self-investment in our model gives rise to equilib-
ria in which agents choose different levels of network investment. Another
difference is our assumption that two agents’ investments in their link are
strategic (imperfect) complements. For the main part of their analysis, Bloch
and Dutta (2009) assume that link quality is an additively separable func-
tion of two agents’ investments in their link. Dero¨ıan (2009) assumes that
an agent’s link investment benefits herself but not her link partner.
Rogers (2006) suggests a different type of network formation game in
which agents invest in links in order to pursue a higher status. An agent’s
status is increasing in the status of agents she is linked to and in the intensity
of those links.
Finally, Golub and Livne (2010), Cabrales et al. (2011), Durieu et al.
(2011) and Galeotti and Merlino (2014) assume that agents can choose one
parameter (quality, effort or investment level) which then affects the inten-
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sities of all their links equally. Such a constraint limits the set of weighted
networks that can form in equilibrium.
Roadmap. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the equi-
librium analysis and is divided into the following subsections: Section 3.1
characterizes the equilibrium investment strategy profiles and utility levels;
Section 3.2 analyzes the relationship graphs of reciprocal and non-reciprocal
equilibria; Section 3.3 discusses the multiplicity of equilibria; and Section 3.4
presents comparative statics results. Section 4 discusses the pairwise stabil-
ity of equilibria and characterizes the efficient networks.
2 The Model
There is a set of agents N = {1, ..., n}. Each agent i possesses resource T > 0
which she can invest in relations with other agents and in private activity. Her
investment in a relation with agent j 6= i is denoted by tij and her investment
in private activity (self-investment) by tii. An investment strategy of agent
i is ti = (ti1, ..., tin) such that tij ≥ 0 for all j and
∑
j tij ≤ T . The analysis
is restricted to pure strategies. A strategy profile is represented by a matrix
t = [tij]i,j and can be interpreted as a weighted directed graph, with tij being
the weight on the link from i to j. We will also refer to strategy profile t as
network t.
Agent i’s utility given network t is the sum of her utilities from relations
with others and from self-investment:
ui(t) =
∑
j 6=i
av(tij, tji) + f(tii)
where av(tij, tji), a > 0 is i’s utility from her relation with j and f(tii) is
her utility from self-investment. The parameter a determines the value of
relationships relative to the value of self-investment.
The relationship utility v is differentiable. The partial derivative of v with
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respect to argument k = 1, 2 is denoted by vk, and the second-order partial
derivative of v with respect to arguments k = 1, 2 and l = 1, 2 is denoted by
vkl. Apart from differentiability, v satisfies the following properties:
P1 v(x, 0) = v(0, y) = 0 for all x, y ≥ 0.
A relationship yields zero benefit if one agent does not invest in the
relationship.
P2 For all x, y > 0, v(x, y) is increasing and strictly concave, and limx→0 v1(x, y) =
∞ for all y > 0.
Agent i’s utility from her relationship with j is increasing and strictly
concave in i’s and j’s investments. Marginal utility is infinite if i’s
investment goes to zero and j invests positively.
P3 v12(x, y) > 0, v21(x, y) > 0 for all x, y > 0.
Two agents’ investments in their relationship are strategic comple-
ments.
P4 v(γx, γy) = γv(x, y) for all γ > 0.
The relationship utility v is homogenous of degree 1 and exhibits con-
stant returns to scale. P4 implies that vk is homogenous of degree
0.
For example, a Cobb-Douglas function v(x, y) = xβ y1−β with β ∈ (0, 1)
satisfies P1-P4.
The utility function from self-investment, f , is increasing, strictly concave
and differentiable, with limx→0 f ′(x) =∞ and limx→T f ′(x) = 0.
A network t induces an unweighted and undirected (relationship) graph
g(t) on N which describes the relationships with mutual positive investments
in t. That is, agents i and j are linked in g(t) (link ij ∈ g(t)) if tij > 0 and
tji > 0.
We introduce some graph-related definitions that are necessary for the
analysis of the game. In what follows, graph always means an unweighted
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and undirected graph. Consider a graph g on N . Agent i’s set of neighbors
is Ni := {j|ij ∈ g}. A walk between agents i and j is a sequence of links
i1i2, i2i3, ..., iK−1iK such that ik−1ik ∈ g for all k = 2, ..., K and i1 = i and
iK = j. Two agents are connected if there exists a walk between them,
and g is connected if all agents in N are connected. A component of g
is a maximal connected subgraph of g. This means that all agents in one
component are connected to each other and not linked to any agent outside
the component. An agent without any links (component of size 1) is called an
isolated agent. To avoid unnecessary complications, we will often refer to the
links, components, etc. of a network t, when we mean the links, components,
etc. of its graph g(t).
3 Equilibrium Networks
The analysis focusses on the Nash equilibria of the network formation game
in which all agents simultaneously choose their investment strategies. A
strategy profile t is a Nash equilibrium if no agent i can strictly increase her
utility by deviating to another strategy, given all other agents’ strategies.
In Section 3.1, we show that every equilibrium is either reciprocal or
non-reciprocal. In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest the same
amount in each other, and all agents have the same self-investment and
utility level. In a non-reciprocal equilibrium, agents can be partitioned into
two sets C (concentrated agents) and D (diversified agents). Links only exist
between the sets, and never within them. For every link, the concentrated
agent invests more in the link than the diversified agent. The ratio between
the concentrated agent’s investment in the link and the diversified agent’s
is the same across all links. All agents within same set have the same self-
investment and utility level.
In Section 3.2, we characterize the relationship graphs of equilibria. We
show that simply by observing an equilibrium relationship graph we can
uniquely determine each agent’s equilibrium self-investment and utility level
as well as the ratio of any two agents’ equilibrium investments in each other.
In particular, the graph can be used to determine whether the equilibrium
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that induced it is reciprocal or non-reciprocal.
In Section 3.3, we discuss the multiplicity of the equilibria. A given
relationship graph can induced by many equilibria, which feature different
link investments. We propose a simple mechanism by which we can construct
multiple equilibria from a given equilibrium.
In Section 3.4, we investigate the comparative statics of equilibria for the
case that relationships become relatively more valuable (i.e. increase in a)
and for the case that the total resource endowment increases (i.e. increase
in T ). Given the multiplicity of equilibria, we restrict ourselves to analyze
the change in the equilibrium values which are uniquely determined by the
relationship graph and the model parameters when the corresponding model
parameter is varied and the relationship graph remains the same.
3.1 Investment Strategy Profiles and Utility Levels
Note that tij = 0 is the unique optimal choice of agent i if agent j chooses
tji = 0 because self-investment is always utility-enhancing and v(tij, 0) = 0
for all tij. Thus, a trivial equilibrium is the empty network where all agents
only invest in themselves. More generally, a network is an equilibrium if
and only if the investment choices of the agents in each component of the
network are an equilibrium of the network formation game reduced to the
agents in that component. Therefore, in order to characterize the full set
of equilibrium networks, we restrict the analysis from now on to connected
equilibrium networks with n > 1.
The next proposition requires the following definitions: Let σ : R>0 →
(0, T ) be the function defined by the equation f ′(σ(x)) = av1(x, 1). Note
that the properties of f guarantee that the function σ is well defined. Let
µ : R>0 → R be the function defined by µ(x) = (T −σ(x))av(1, 1
x
)+f(σ(x)).
Lemma 1. The function σ is strictly increasing and the function µ is strictly
decreasing.
The proof of Lemma 1 is relegated to the appendix.
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Proposition 1. For every equilibrium t, there exists qt ≥ 1 such that for
every i ∈ N , there exists qi where qi ∈
{
qt, 1
qt
}
and
tij
tji
= qi for all j ∈ Ni,
tii = σ(qi) and ui(t) = µ(qi). Thus, every equilibrium t is either
(i) reciprocal (qt = 1) where qi = 1 for all i ∈ N .
or
(ii) non-reciprocal (qt > 1) where there is a bipartition (C,D) of N such
that if i is linked to j, then i and j are in different sets. For all i ∈ C
and j ∈ D, qi = qt and qj = 1qt .
Proof. We start with a lemma that establishes necessary and sufficient con-
ditions on t for it to be a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. A network t is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all i ∈ N
and all j 6= i,
a)
∑
k tik = T ,
b) if tji = 0, then tij = 0,
c) if tji > 0, then tij > 0 and av1(tij, tji) = f
′(tii).
The proof of Lemma 2 is immediate from the standard conditions on each
agent’s utility maximization problem given all other agents’ strategies and
is omitted. In any equilibrium, each agent i invests her entire resource and
invests positively in j if and only if j invests positively in i. An agent’s
positive investment levels are such that her marginal utility from investing
in any of her links is equal to her marginal utility from self-investment.
Now consider an equilibrium t and i ∈ N . Note first that v1(tij, tji) =
v1
(
tij
tji
, 1
)
for all j ∈ Ni by P4. By Lemma 2c, v1
(
tij
tji
, 1
)
= v1
(
tik
tki
, 1
)
for
all j, k ∈ Ni. Thus, tijtji =
tik
tki
for all j, k ∈ Ni because v is strictly concave.
Hence, there is qi > 0 such that
tij
tji
= qi for all j ∈ Ni. Then, qj = 1qi for all
j ∈ Ni. Let qt = max
{
qi,
1
qi
}
. Since all agents are connected, qk ∈
{
qt, 1
qt
}
for all k ∈ N .
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By Lemma 2c, it then follows with regard to agent i’s self-investment
that f ′(tii) = av1(qi, 1) and hence tii = σ(qi). Regarding agent i’s utility,
observe that ui(t) =
∑
j 6=i av(tij, tji) + f(tii) =
∑
j 6=i tijav(1,
tji
tij
) + f(tii) =
(T − tii)av(1, 1qi ) + f(tii) = µ(qi) because v is homogenous of degree 1 and
tii = σ(qi).
In the case of a reciprocal equilibrium in which qt = 1, obviously qk = 1
for all k ∈ N . In the case of a non-reciprocal equilibrium with qt > 1, there
exists an agent i ∈ N for whom qi = qt. For all j ∈ Ni, qj = 1qi = 1qt , and
so on. Thus, because qi =
1
qj
for all i and all j ∈ Ni, there exists a partition
(C,D) of N in which all i with qi = q
t are in C and all j with qj =
1
qt
are in
D, and there are only links across the sets.
It is worthwhile summarizing the observations about equilibria which fol-
low from Proposition 1. Every equilibrium t is associated with a number qt
which we call the investment ratio of t. In equilibrium t, for any link which
agent i has, the ratio of i’s investment to her neighbor’s investment in the
link is equal to qi. This ratio qi is either q
t or 1
qt
. Agent i’s equilibrium self-
investment level is a strictly increasing function of qi while her equilibrium
utility level is a strictly decreasing function of qi.
In any reciprocal equilibrium, every agent’s qi is equal to one, and every
agent chooses the same level of self-investment and derives the same level of
utility. We call the agents in a reciprocal equilibrium balanced and denote
their self-investment and utility by tbb := σ(1) and ub := µ(1), respectively.
In any non-reciprocal equilibrium t, there exists a partition of N into two
sets C and D such that links only exist between agents in different sets. We
call the agents in C concentrated and the agents in D diversified. For every
concentrated agent i, qi = q
t and for every diversified agent i, qi =
1
qt
. This
means that, for any link, the concentrated agent invests more in the link than
the diversified agent. Moreover, all agents in the same set choose the same
level of self-investment and derive the same level of utility. We denote the
self-investment of concentrated agents and diversified agents by tcc := σ(q
t)
and tdd := σ(
1
qt
) and their utility by uc := µ(q
t)and ud := µ(
1
qt
), respectively.
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Since σ is strictly increasing and µ is strictly decreasing, the equilibrium
levels of self-investment and utility are unambiguously ordered for different
values of qi. For any reciprocal equilibrium t and any non-reciprocal equilib-
rium t′, t′dd < tbb < t
′
cc, and u
′
d > ub > u
′
c. In other words, diversified agents
have the lowest self-investment and highest utility, concentrated agents have
the highest self-investment and lowest utility, and balanced agents have both
a self-investment and utility somewhere in between. Note that the ordering
of self-investment levels trivially imposes an ordering on agents’ total equi-
librium network investment. A diversified agent chooses the highest total
network investment, a concentrated agent the lowest and a balanced agent
chooses somewhere in between.
The divergence of t′dd and t
′
cc from tbb is strictly increasing in q
t′ , as is the
divergence of u′d and u
′
c from ub. Thus, for any equilibrium t, the investment
ratio qt is an indication of the overall degree of inequality between agents
in t. The differences in two agents’ investments in the link between them,
in agents’ self-investment levels and in agents’ utility levels are all strictly
increasing in qt.
Example 1 illustrates a reciprocal equilibrium and two non-reciprocal
equilibria with different investment ratios for a specific configuration of the
model.
Example 1. Let n = 5, T = 2, and ui(t) =
∑
j 6=i t
β
ijt
1−β
ji + t
β
ii with β ∈ (0, 1).
By Lemma 2, in equilibrium, agent i’s marginal utilities from investing in
link ij and from self-investment are equal:
av1(tij, tji) = f
′(tii) ⇔ βtβ−1ij t1−βji = βtβ−1ii ⇔ tii =
tij
tji
.
Thus, in every reciprocal equilibrium t, tbb = 1 and ub = 2. Figure 1 shows
an example of a reciprocal equilibrium t.
In every non-reciprocal equilibrium t, tcc = q
t, tdd =
1
qt
, uc = (T −
qt)
(
1
qt
)1−β
+ qt
β
and ud = (T − 1qt )qt1−β +
(
1
qt
)β
. An example of a non-
reciprocal equilibrium t where qt = 3
2
, C = {1, 2, 3, 4} and D = {5} is shown
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Figure 1: A reciprocal equilibrium t. Bold numbers indicate the identity of
each agent (node), and the number at link ij is tij = tji.
in Figure 2a. An example of a non-reciprocal equilibrium t′ with a lower
degree of inequality where qt
′
= 8
7
, C ′ = {1, 3, 5} and D′ = {2, 4} is shown in
Figure 2b.
(a) qt = 32 (b) q
t′ = 87
Figure 2: Two non-reciprocal equilibria t and t′ with different investment
ratios. Bold numbers indicate the identity of each agent (node), and the
number next to agent i at link ij is tij.
3.2 Relationship Graphs
In this section, we investigate the graphs of equilibrium networks where a link
between two agents means that both invest positively in each other. We will
show that simply by observing the graph of an equilibrium we can uniquely
determine qi, tii and ui(t) for each agent i, without any other information
about the investment profile.
Let GR = {g | g = g(t) for some reciprocal equilibrium t}, that is, GR is
the set of all graphs that are induced by some reciprocal equilibrium, and let
GNR = {g | g = g(t) for some non-reciprocal equilibrium t}, that is, GNR is
the set of all graphs that are induced by some non-reciprocal equilibrium.
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We first provide a full characterization of GR.1 Let g [N\U ] with U ⊆ N
be the subgraph induced in g by N\U . Denote by W (U) the set of isolated
agents in g [N\U ] and by |X| the cardinality of a set X.
Proposition 2. A connected graph g on N is in GR if and only if for every
U ⊆ N ,
1) |U | > |W (U)|, or
2) |U | = |W (U)| and for every link ij ∈ g, if i ∈ U , then j ∈ W (U).
Proposition 2 states that a connected graph g is induced by some recipro-
cal equilibrium if and only if for every U ⊆ N either 1) the number of agents
in U is strictly larger than the number of isolated agents in g [N\U ], or 2)
the number of agents in U and of isolated agents in g [N\U ] are the same,
and in g, agents in U are only linked to agents in W (U). We will refer to
Condition 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 as Condition 2.1 and 2.2.
Proof of Proposition 2: Necessity. Let a connected graph g be in GR and let
t be a reciprocal equilibria t such that g(t) = g.
The total network investment by agents in U is |U |(T −tbb) and by agents
in W (U) is |W (U)|(T − tbb). In g, every i ∈ W (U) is only linked to agents
in U , otherwise i ∈ W (U) would not be isolated in g [N\U ]. Thus, the total
network investment by agents in W (U) must be fully reciprocated by agents
in U . Then either |U |(T − tbb) > |W (U)|(T − tbb) which means |U | > |W (U)|,
or |U |(T − tbb) = |W (U)|(T − tbb) which means |U | = |W (U)| and agents in
U must be linked only to agents in W (U) in g. Otherwise, the network
investment by agents in U would not be sufficient to fully reciprocate that
by agents in W (U).
The sufficiency proof of Proposition 2 relies on an existence result for a
particular type of matching in a graph in Schrijver (2004, p. 584). Because
it is largely technical, the proof is relegated to the appendix and only a short
outline is provided here. We show first that a reciprocal equilibrium t with
g(t) = g exists if a perfect b-matching for the connected graph g exists and
1Proposition 2 was established with the help of Henning Bruhn-Fujimoto.
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second that a perfect b-matching for g exists if g is connected and is such
that, for every U ⊆ N , Condition 2.1 or 2.2 is satisfied.
Proposition 2 provides a tool to determine whether a connected graph
g is induced by some reciprocal equilibrium. For this, it is sufficient to
determine whether Condition 2.1 or 2.2 is satisfied when |U | < n
2
+ 1, since
for |U | ≥ n
2
+ 1, Condition 2.1 is trivially satisfied. Some straightforward
graph properties simplify this task, as shown below in Corollary 1.
An agent is a leaf in graph g if she has only one link. A graph g is
bipartite or has a bipartition if there exists a bipartition (A,B) of N such
that if ij ∈ g, then i and j are in different sets of the bipartition.
Corollary 1.
Let g be a connected graph on N .
a) If |Ni| > n2 for all i ∈ N , then g ∈ GR.
b) If |Ni| = d > 0 for all i ∈ N , then g ∈ GR.
c) If n > 2 and g contains a leaf, then g /∈ GR.
d) If g is bipartite with |A| 6= |B|, then g /∈ GR.
Proof.
a) Given g, |U | > n
2
is necessary to have at least one isolated agent in
g[N\U ]. Hence, |U | > |W (U)| for all U and g ∈ GR by Proposition 2.
b) Given g, every agent in W (U) is linked to d agents in U and thus
there exist d|W (U)| links between U and W (U). If every i ∈ U is
only linked to agents in W (U), then d|U | = d|W (U)| and Condition
2.2 is satisfied. If not every i ∈ U is only linked to agents in W (U),
then d|U | > d|W (U)| and Condition 2.1 is satisfied. Thus, g ∈ GR by
Proposition 2.
c) Given g, let i be a leaf. Take U = Ni. Then, |W (U)| ≥ |U | and the
only neighbor of agent i is not only linked to i but also to other agents
because n > 2. Thus, g /∈ GR by Proposition 2.
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d) Given g where w.l.o.g |A| > |B|, take U = B. Then, W (U) = A and
|W (U)| > |U |. Thus, g /∈ GR by Proposition 2.
Hence, by Corollary 1a and 1b, any connected graph that is “dense” or
“regular” is induced by some reciprocal equilibrium. By Corollary 1c and 1d,
graphs which contain leaves (for example, trees), or graphs that are bipartite
with two unequally sized sets are never induced by a reciprocal equilibrium.
We next turn to analyze GNR. In Proposition 3, we present necessary con-
ditions for a graph to be in GNR. Let ρ : R>1 → R>1 be the function defined
by ρ(x) = x
T−σ( 1
x
)
T−σ(x) . Given that σ is strictly increasing, it is straightforward
to show that ρ(x) > 1 for all x and that ρ is strictly increasing.
Proposition 3. If g ∈ GNR, then g has a unique bipartition (A,B). W.l.o.g.
let |A| ≥ |B|. For any non-reciprocal equilibrium t with g(t) = g, |A||B| =
ρ(qt) > 1, for every i ∈ A, qi = qt, and every j ∈ B, qj = 1qt and |Nj| > 1.
Proposition 3 makes several statements. Consider any g ∈ GNR. The
graph g has exactly one bipartition and the two sets in that bipartition
are of unequal size. For any non-reciprocal equilibrium that induces g, all
concentrated agents are in the larger set of the bipartition and all diversified
agents are in the smaller one. Any leaf is in the larger set and thus is a
concentrated agent. There is a strictly increasing correspondence between
the investment ratio qt and the ratio of concentrated to diversified agents.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let g be in GNR and let t be an equilibrium with
g(t) = g. By Proposition 1, each link is between a member of C (concentrated
agents) and a member of D (diversified agents). Thus, (C,D) is a bipartition
of g. Since g is connected, a standard result from graph theory implies that
the bipartition of g is unique.
For all i ∈ C and j ∈ D, tij
tji
= qt if ij ∈ g by Proposition 1. Thus∑
i∈C,j∈D tij = q
t
∑
i∈C,j∈D tji which is equivalent to
∑
i∈C(T−tii) = qt
∑
j∈D(T−
tjj). Hence |C|(T − tcc) = qt|D|(T − tdd) and |C||D| = qt T−tddT−tcc = qt
T−σ( 1
qt
)
T−σ(qt) =
ρ(qt).
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Suppose to the contrary that agent i is a leaf and is in D. Then i’s only
link is with some j ∈ C. This implies, using Lemma 2 and Proposition 1,
that tii + tij = T < tjj + tji and j’s resource constraint is violated.
The fact that each g ∈ GNR is bipartite implies that there exists no graph
in GNR which includes an odd cycle.2 Proposition 3 also provides further
insight regarding the investment strategies of concentrated and diversified
agents in a non-reciprocal equilibrium: A diversified agent has on average
more links than a concentrated agent, since the network is connected and
|C| > |D|.
The next result shows that a reciprocal equilibrium and a non-reciprocal
equilibrium never induce the same graph. Moreover, some graphs cannot be
induced by any equilibrium.
Proposition 4. For every n ≥ 2, GR∩GNR = ∅, and for every n ≥ 4, there
exists a connected graph g on N such that g /∈ GR ∪GNR.
Proof. By Corollary 1d, there exists no g ∈ GR with a bipartition where the
two sets of the bipartition are of unequal size. By Proposition 3, every g ∈
GNR has a bipartition with the two sets of unequal size. Thus, GR∩GNR = ∅.
Let n ≥ 4 and consider the following graph. Agents 1, 2, and 3 form a
triangle. Every other agent is only linked to agent 1. Thus, g includes an odd
cycle and hence g /∈ GNR. Moreover, g contains a leaf and hence g /∈ GR.
Another family of graphs (in addition to the one described in the proof
above) that cannot be induced by any equilibrium is one in which two leaves
are connected via an odd number of links: If such a graph were in GR, it
would not include a leaf, and if it were in GNR, both leaves would be in C
and thus would have to be connected via an even number of links.
Proposition 3 and 4 imply that the information about the graph g induced
by an equilibrium t is sufficient to determine qi, tii, and ui(t) for all i in
equilibrium t. If g has a bipartition (A,B) where A and B are of unequal
2An odd cycle is a sequence of links i1i2, ..., iK−1iK where ij 6= ik for k /∈ {1,K},
i1 = iK and K > 2 is even.
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size and w.l.o.g. |A| > |B|, then any equilibrium t that induces g is non-
reciprocal where qt = ρ−1
(
|A|
|B|
)
and for all i ∈ A, qi = qt, and for all i ∈ B,
qi =
1
qt
. Otherwise, any equilibrium that induces g is reciprocal, and qi = 1
for all i. Self-investment and utility levels follow from Proposition 1.
3.3 Equilibrium Multiplicity
We now turn to equilibrium multiplicity. Based on the previous section,
equilibria that induce the same graph must feature the same values of qi, tii
and ui(t) for all i because the equilibrium graph uniquely determines those
values. However, equilibria that induce the same graph may feature different
levels of investments in links and those are therefore not uniquely determined
by the graph. We capture the multiplicity with a simple mechanism that
derives an equilibrium t′ from an equilibrium t. The mechanism relies on
appropriately shifting link investment levels in t on an even-lengthed cycle.
Proposition 5. Let n ≥ 4 and let t be an equilibrium with g(t) = g. Then,
the following strategy profile t′ is also an equilibrium.
First, let S be a sequence of distinct agents i1, i2, ..., iK−1 and iK = i1
such that K > 4 is an odd integer, ikik+1 ∈ g for odd k, and if qt > 1,
then ik ∈ C and ik+1 ∈ D for odd k. Second, let t′ be equal to t, except for
t′ikik+1 = tikik+1 + x > 0 and t
′
ikik−1 = tikik−1 − x > 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}
where x = −h if k is odd, x = l if k is even, and h
l
= qt.
Proof. Consider agent ik. The only change in agent ik’s strategy from t to t
′ is
a shift of her investment by an amount x between agents ik−1 and ik+1. Thus,
agent ik’s budget constraint remains binding in t
′. The only investments by
other agents in agent ik that have changed from t to t
′ are those of agents
ik−1 and ik+1. Thus, t′ikj = t
′
jik
= 0 if ikj /∈ g(t) and t
′
ikj
t′jik
= qik if ikj ∈ g(t)
for all j 6= ik−1, ik+1. We next show that t
′
ikj
t′jik
= qik also for j = ik−1, ik+1. If
k is odd and j = ik+1, then qik = q
t and
t′ik,ik+1
t′ik+1,ik
=
tik,ik+1 − h
tik+1,ik − l
=
qt
(
tik,ik+1 − h
)
qt
(
tik+1,ik − l
) = qt (tik,ik+1 − h)tik,ik+1
tik+1,ik
tik+1,ik − hl l
= qt
tik,ik+1 − h
tik,ik+1 − h
= qt.
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Similarly, for j = ik−1 and then also for even k.
For any agent i not in the sequence S, t′i = ti and the investments in i
are the same in both t′ and t. Thus, t′ is an equilibrium by Lemma 2.
In Example 2, we apply the mechanism provided in Proposition 5.
Example 2. Consider the environment of Example 1. In Figure 3, t is
a reciprocal equilibrium, and in Figure 4, t is a non-reciprocal equilibrium
with qt = 8
7
. In both, t′ is an equilibrium obtained from t by applying the
mechanism described in Proposition 5.
Figure 3: Deriving a reciprocal equilibrium t′ from the reciprocal equilibrium
t.
Figure 4: Deriving a non-reciprocal equilibrium t′ from the non-reciprocal
equilibrium t.
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3.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we present the comparative statics of the equilibria for the
following changes: (i) when the investment in a relationship becomes more
valuable relative to self-investment (i.e. an increase in a) and (ii) the total
resources available for investment increase (i.e. an increase in T ). Given
the multiplicity of equilibria, we limit ourselves to the following comparative
statics exercise: Consider a particular graph induced by an equilibrium. As-
suming that the graph remains unchanged, what is the effect of a change in
the model parameters on those equilibrium values of the strategy profile that
are uniquely determined by the graph and the parameters?
Note that previously we assumed for simplicity that limx→T f ′(x) = 0 in
order to guarantee that every agent chooses a self-investment less than T
in any equilibrium. Keeping this assumption and altering T would change
the function f and render the comparative statics for T impossible. In this
section, we assume that f is fixed and that all values of T satisfy f ′(T ) <
v1(n − 1, 1). That is, f ′(T ) is low enough to guarantee equilibrium self-
investments less than T for all T .
Proposition 6.
a) Consider a < aˆ. Let t be an equilibrium given a, and let tˆ be an
equilibrium given aˆ where t and tˆ induce the same graph (g(t) = g(tˆ)).
If qt = 1, then qˆt = 1 and tbb > tˆbb.
If qt > 1, then qˆt > 1, |C||D| =
|Cˆ|
|Dˆ| , tcc > tˆcc, and tdd > tˆdd.
b) Consider T < Tˆ and suppose that f = fˆ with f ′(T ) < v1(n− 1, 1). Let
t be an equilibrium given T , and let tˆ be an equilibrium given Tˆ where
g(t) = g(tˆ).
If qt = 1, then qˆt = 1 and tbb = tˆbb.
If qt > 1, then qt < qˆt, |C||D| =
|Cˆ|
|Dˆ| , tcc < tˆcc, T − tcc < Tˆ − tˆcc and
tdd > tˆdd.
Before presenting the proof, it is worthwhile restating Proposition 6. Con-
sider part a). Unsurprisingly, since investment in a relationship is more valu-
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able under aˆ than under a, the self-investment of all types of agents is lower
under aˆ than under a. If t is a non-reciprocal equilibrium, then the ratio of
concentrated to diversified agents remains the same, and the effect on the
investment ratio is not uniquely determined.
Consider part b). As the resource endowment increases, the self-investment
level of balanced agents remains the same and therefore their network invest-
ment increases. If t is a non-reciprocal equilibrium, then the concentrated-
to-diversified-agents ratio remains unchanged. Both a concentrated agent’s
self-investment and her network investment are increasing in the resource
endowment, whereas a diversified agent’s self-investment decreases and thus
her network investment increases by a larger amount than the increase in the
resource endowment. An increase in the resource endowment also increases
the ratio of a concentrated agent’s investment to that of a diversified agent
in the link between them.
Proof of Proposition 6, part a). (The proof for part b) proceeds similarly and
is relegated to the appendix.)
Consider qt = 1. Then, g(t) ∈ GR. The set GR is independent of a by
Proposition 2. Therefore, g(tˆ) ∈ GˆR and qˆt = 1. By Proposition 1, f ′(tbb) =
av1(1, 1). Then, by the implicit function theorem,
∂tbb
∂a
= v1(1,1)
f ′′(tbb)
which is
strictly negative because f is strictly concave and v is strictly increasing.
Thus, tbb > tˆbb.
Next consider qt > 1. Then g(t) = g(tˆ) /∈ GR = GˆR and thus qˆt >
1. By Proposition 3, the bipartition of g(t) is unique, and thus |C||D| =
|Cˆ|
|Dˆ| .
By Proposition 1 and 3, tˆ is such that i) f ′(tˆcc) = aˆv1(qˆt, 1), ii) f ′(tˆdd) =
aˆv1(
1
qˆt
, 1), and iii) |C||D| = qˆ
t T−tˆdd
T−tˆcc , and the analogous conditions hold for t.
Suppose by contradiction that tˆcc ≥ tcc. Then qˆt > qt by i). This implies
that tˆdd < tdd by ii). Then
|C|
|D| < qˆ
t T−tˆdd
T−tˆcc , contradicting iii). The proof that
tˆdd < tdd proceeds analogously.
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4 Stability and Efficiency
In this section, we will show that Nash equilibria are not “stable” if pair-
wise deviations are allowed, and are not efficient, in the sense that they do
not maximize the sum of agents’ utilities. This is due to the positive ex-
ternalities of an agent’s network investment on her neighbors, which are not
incorporated into an agent’s individual utility maximization.
4.1 Equilibrium Stability
Following Bloch and Dutta (2009), we say that a strategy profile t is strongly
pairwise stable if it is a Nash equilibrium and if there are no two agents (i, j)
who would both be strictly better off by a joint deviation from (ti, tj) to
(t′i, t
′
j), given all other agents’ strategies.
Proposition 7. No strategy profile t is strongly pairwise stable.
Proof. We will show that for any equilibrium, there exist two agents who
gain from reducing their self-investment and establishing or intensifying a
reciprocal relationship among them. Suppose t is an equilibrium. Consider
any i ∈ N and any j 6= i. If i reduces her self-investment by c > 0, and i
and j each invest c in order to intensify or establish a reciprocal link between
them, then i’s change in utility is ∆ui(c) = f(tii − c)− f(tii) + cav(1, 1). If
i is a balanced or concentrated agent, then there is c > 0 such that ∆ui(c)
is positive because ∂∆ui
∂c
(0) = −f ′(tii) + av(1, 1) and f ′(tii) < av(1, 1) =
a(v1(1, 1)+v2(1, 1)) for tii ∈ {tbb, tcc}. If qt = 1, then there exist two balanced
agents, and if qt > 1, then there exist two concentrated agents, and therefore,
in each case there is a pair with a strict incentive to jointly deviate.
4.2 Efficient Networks
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we say that a strategy profile t is
efficient if t maximizes
∑
i∈N ui(t) such that
∑
j tij = T for all i.
We will see that the set of efficient networks and the set of equilibrium
networks do not intersect. However, there is no distinction between the set
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of all graphs that are induced some efficient network and the set of all graphs
that are induced some reciprocal equilibrium.
Proposition 8. A network t is efficient if and only if tij = tji,
∑
k tik = T
and f ′(tii) = av (1, 1) for all i and all j 6= i. A graph is induced by an
efficient network if and only if each of its components is induced by some
reciprocal equilibrium of the network formation game reduced to the agents
in that component.
Proposition 8 states that in every efficient network any two agents invest
the same amount in each other. Moreover, any agent’s self-investment is such
that her marginal utility from self-investment equals the marginal increase
in the sum of her own and her neighbor’s utility from her investment in
their reciprocal link. Thus, the efficient level of self-investment accounts
for the positive externalities from network investment and is lower than the
level of self-investment in a reciprocal equilibrium. Since every agent’s self-
investment is less than T (as implied by the assumptions on f), there is no
isolated agent in an efficient network. In particular, the set of all graphs of
efficient networks is identical to the set of all graphs of equilibrium networks
which only consist of reciprocal equilibrium components.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let t be efficient. Then every agent’s resource con-
straint is binding, since self-investment is always beneficial. Moreover, for
all i and j 6= i, tii > 0, and tij = 0 if and only if tji = 0. By the first-
order conditions on t to maximize the sum of utilities, any positive link
investments tii, tij and tji must satisfy f
′(tii) = av1 (tij, tji) + av2 (tji, tij) =
av1
(
tij
tji
, 1
)
+ av2
(
1,
tij
tji
)
for all j ∈ Ni and all i. In other words, agent i’s
investment in her link with agent j is such that its marginal impact on the
sum of utilities equals agent i’s marginal utility from self-investment.
We next show that any link is reciprocal, that is tij = tji for all tij, tji > 0.
Suppose to the contrary that link ij is non-reciprocal and w.l.o.g
tij
tji
> 1.
Hence, f ′(tii) = av1
(
tij
tji
, 1
)
+av2
(
1,
tij
tji
)
< f ′(tjj) = av1
(
tji
tij
, 1
)
+av2
(
1,
tji
tij
)
by the concavity of v and tii > tjj by the concavity of f . Since tij + tii >
tji + tjj and i’s resource constraint must bind, j must have another link to
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some agent k 6= i. By efficiency and the strict concavity of v, tji
tij
=
tjk
tkj
< 1,
and tkl
tlk
= tim
tmi
> 1 for all l ∈ Nk and m ∈ Ni which implies that i and k are
not linked and tik = tki = 0. Now consider strategy profile t
′ 6= t where the
self-investment of both i and k is reduced by c and a reciprocal link between
them is established with an investment of c by each. As in the proof for
Proposition 7, we can show that there is c > 0 such that ui(t
′) − ui(t) > 0
and uk(t
′) − uk(t) > 0. Moreover, ul(t′) = ul(t) for all l 6= i, k and no
agent’s resource constraint has been affected by moving from t to t′. Hence,
a non-reciprocal link cannot exist in an efficient network.
Thus, tij = tji for all i and j, and av1 (1, 1)+av2 (1, 1) = av (1, 1) = f
′(tii)
for all i who have a link. It remains to show that every agent has a link.
Assume there exist at least two isolated agents i and j. Then, tii = tjj = T
by efficiency. However, by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition
7, the sum of utilities can be increased if their self-investment is decreased
and a reciprocal link between them is established.
Assume there exists only one isolated agent i. Let agents j and k be
linked to each other. In this case, the sum of utilities can be increased as
follows: Decrease i’s self-investment by 2 > 0 and the investments by j and
k in their link jk by  each and establish the reciprocal links ij and ik, with
t′ij = t
′
ji = t
′
ik = t
′
ki = . For  small enough, i’s utility strictly increases and
the utility of no other agent changes, by v’s homogeneity of degree 1.
Let t be such that tij = tji,
∑
k tik = T and f
′(tii) = av (1, 1) for
all i and all j 6= i. Then, agent i’s utility is ui(t) =
∑
j 6=i av(tij, tji) +
f(tii) =
∑
j∈Ni av(tij, tji)+f(tii) =
∑
j∈Ni atijv(1,
tji
tij
)+f(tii) =
∑
j∈Ni a(T−
tii)v(1, 1) + f(tii). Thus, the sum of utilities for any such t is the same and
hence any such t is efficient. This concludes the first part of the proof of
Proposition 8.
To prove the second part, first observe that we know from the first part of
Proposition 8 that in an efficient network, every agent belongs to a component
of at least two agents who are connected via reciprocal links.
The result then follows from the observation that a connected graph g
is induced by an efficient network if and only if g is induced by a reciprocal
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equilibrium: Let t be an efficient network that induces a connected graph g.
Thus, tij = tji > 0 for all ij ∈ g, tij = tji = 0 for all ij /∈ g,
∑
j∈Ni tij =
T − tii for all i and f ′(tii) = av(1, 1). Then, the following t′ is a reciprocal
equilibrium that induces g. Let t′ be such that t′ij = t
′
ji = tij
T−t′ii
T−tii for all
ij ∈ g, t′ij = t′ji = 0 for all ij /∈ g, and f ′(t′ii) = av1(1, 1).
Let t′ be a reciprocal equilibrium that induces a connected graph g. Thus,
t′ij = t
′
ji > 0 for all ij ∈ g, t′ij = t′ji = 0 for all ij /∈ g,
∑
j∈Ni t
′
ij = T − t′ii
for all i and f ′(t′ii) = av1(1, 1). Then, the following t is a connected efficient
network that induces g. Let t be such that tij = tji = t
′
ij
T−tii
T−t′ii for all ij ∈ g,
tij = tji = 0 for all ij /∈ g, and f ′(tii) = av(1, 1).
5 Concluding Comments
We analyzed a game of weighted network formation in which agents simul-
taneously decide how to allocate a limited budget between building links
of possibly different intensities with other agents and self-investment. Ex-
panding the discussion of network formation from unweighted to weighted
networks enlarges the strategy space of agents. Nevertheless, we obtained
results about the structure of the game’s equilibria. In particular, we showed
that an equilibrium must have one of two structures, i.e. either reciprocal or
non-reciprocal, and we characterized their properties.
Some of the results are consistent with empirical findings. First, note
that in both reciprocal and non-reciprocal equilibria two agents’ investments
in the link between them are predicted to be positively correlated. Griffith
(2017) finds support for this property in his analyis of a weighted social
network among school girls. He shows that the weights assigned by two girls
to their relation are positively (though not perfectly) correlated.
The presence of reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations is investigated in
Wang et al. (2013). They find that in a mobile phone communication net-
work, 72% of all links are such that the two linked agents call each other with
significantly different probabilities. They further suggest that the presence of
reciprocal relations is more likely when the total network investment (num-
ber of calls made) by an agent is positively correlated across linked agents.
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This is in line with our theoretical findings: In a reciprocal equilibrium, each
agent chooses the same total network investment which is thus predicted to
be perfectly and positively correlated across agents, while in a non-reciprocal
equilibrium, the level of total network investments by a concentrated agent
is negatively correlated with that by a diversified agent.
We also characterized the properties of the graphs for reciprocal and non-
reciprocal equilibria. We showed, for example, that any sufficiently “dense”
graph, where density is measured by the number of links in the graph, or a
“regular” graph, in which every agent has the same number of neighbors, is
only induced by reciprocal equilibria (Corollary 1a and 1b). Some empirical
studies provide evidence for a positive correlation between reciprocity and
network density and/or regularity (for example, Kovanen et al. (2010) and
Wang et al. (2013) for mobile phone communication networks). We also
found that in graphs of non-reciprocal equilibria, diversified agents have on
average more links than concentrated agents. This again resonates with
Wang et al. (2013) who suggest that “networked systems that induce anti-
correlation in the number of neighbors of each vertex [agent] in a dyad [link]
should all else being equal be characterized by high levels of non-reciprocity”.
On an anecdotal level, the three types of agents that arise in our model’s
equilibria can perhaps be observed in real life. Diversified agents are more
popular and outgoing, they more actively network and free-ride on the efforts
of other agents. Concentrated agents rely more on themselves, are more in-
troverted, provide greater effort in relationships, and are exploited. Balanced
agents are in give-and-take relationships and share responsibilities equally.
An avenue for further research would be to introduce heterogeneity be-
tween agents and to investigate how this affects the existence and properties
of reciprocal and non-reciprocal equilibria. A first step could be to differen-
tiate between two types of agents, where linking to one of the types is more
profitable than linking to the other.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Since f and v are both increasing and strictly concave,
it immediately follows that σ is strictly increasing.
We next show that ∂µ
∂x
is strictly negative.
∂µ
∂x
= −σ′(x)av
(
1,
1
x
)
− (T − σ(x))av2
(
1,
1
x
)
1
x2
+ f ′(σ(x))σ′(x) (1)
= −σ′(x)av
(
1,
1
x
)
− (T − σ(x))av2
(
1,
1
x
)
1
x2
+ av1(x, 1)σ
′(x) (2)
= −(T − σ(x))av2
(
1,
1
x
)
1
x2
+ σ′(x)
[
av1(x, 1)− av
(
1,
1
x
)]
(3)
= −(T − σ(x))av2
(
1,
1
x
)
1
x2
+ σ′(x)
{
av1
(
1,
1
x
)
− a
[
v1
(
1,
1
x
)
+
1
x
v2
(
1,
1
x
)]}
(4)
= −(T − σ(x))av2
(
1,
1
x
)
1
x2
− σ′(x)a1
x
v2
(
1,
1
x
)
(5)
< 0 (6)
To get from (1) to (2), we use f ′(σ(x)) = v1(x, 1); from (3) to (4), we use
Euler’s Theorem and that v1 is homogeneous of degree 0; and from (5) to
(6), we use σ′(x) > 0.
Sufficiency proof of Proposition 2. In the following we prove that
there exists a reciprocal equilibrium t with g(t) = g and hence g ∈ GR if g is
connected and is such that for every U ⊆ N Condition 2.1 or 2.2 is satisfied.
For the proof, we draw on Theorem 35.1 in Schrijver (2004, p. 584),
which states necessary and sufficient conditions for a perfect b-matching to
exist for a graph g. A perfect b-matching for g is a function which assigns
a value to each link such that the sum of the values of links incident at one
node is equal to the b-value of that node.
We will first show that if a perfect b-matching for a connected graph g
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exists, then a reciprocal equilibrium t with g(t) = g exists, and second, that
if g is connected and is such that for all U ⊆ N either condition 2.1 or 2.2
is true, then a perfect b-matching for g exists (for the second part, we use
the theorem in Schrijver (2004)). This will prove sufficiency for Proposition 2.
Consider a graph g on N . Let Eg be the set of all links in g and let
Eg[X, Y ] be the set of links xy ∈ g with x ∈ X ⊆ N , y ∈ Y ⊆ N and
X ∩ Y = ∅. Let Eg[Y ] be the set of links ij ∈ g with i, j ∈ Y ⊆ N . Denote
by δ(i) the set of links incident at node i ∈ N . Let g[Y ] be the subgraph
induced in g by Y ⊆ N . For every vector w ∈ RY with vector components
wy, let w(U) :=
∑
y∈U wy for any U ⊆ Y . The set of integers is denoted by
Z.
Considering just a special case, Theorem 35.1 in Schrijver (2004, p. 584)
can be reduced to the following statement.
Special case of Theorem 35.1 in Schrijver (2004, p. 584). Let g
be a graph on N and let b ∈ ZN and c ∈ ZEg with every cij > 1. Then,
there exists an x ∈ ZEg such that (i) 1 ≤ xij ≤ cij for all ij ∈ Eg and (ii)
x(δ(i)) = bi for all i ∈ N if and only if for each partition {T, V, Y } of N , the
number of components K of g[T ] with
(35.2) b (K) + c (Eg[K,Y ]) + |Eg[K,V ]|
odd is at most
(35.3) b (V )− 2 |Eg[V ]| − |Eg[T, V ]| − b (Y ) + 2c (Eg[Y ]) + c (Eg[T, Y ]) .
Let every cij = γ with γ extremely large and every bi = β with β suf-
ficiently large. If g is connected and x given g exists, then a reciprocal
equilibrium t with g(t) = g is such that tij = tji =
xij
β
(T − tbb) for all ij ∈ Eg
and tij = tji = 0 for all ij /∈ Eg.
Let g be connected and such that for all U ⊆ N , with W (U) being the
set of isolates in g [N\U ], either
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1. |U | > |W (U)|, or
2. |U | = |W (U)| and for every link ij ∈ Eg, if i ∈ U , then j ∈ W (U).
We will next show by contradiction that x exists given g.
Suppose x does not exist. Then, by the theorem in Schrijver (2004, p.
584), there must be a partition {T, V, Y } of N such that the number of
components K of g[T ] with (35.2) odd is greater than (35.3); otherwise x
would exist.
For any partition with Eg[Y ] 6= ∅ and/or Eg[T, Y ] 6= ∅, the number of
components K with (35.2) odd is always smaller than (35.3) because γ is
extremely large and the number of components K is finite. Then, there must
be a partition with Eg[Y ] = Eg[T, Y ] = ∅ with a number of components K
with (35.2) odd greater than (35.3).
For every partition {T, V, Y } with Eg[Y ] = Eg[T, Y ] = ∅, it must be true
that every i ∈ Y has links to nodes in V only and that every i ∈ Y has at
least one link to nodes in V because g is connected. Then, Y is a subset
of the set of isolates in g [N\V ]. Hence, Y ⊆ W (U) for U = V . We know
that in g for all U ⊆ N either 1. |U | > |W (U)|, or 2. |U | = |W (U)| and for
every link ij ∈ Eg, if i ∈ U , then j ∈ W (U). This implies that, for any V ,
either 1. |V | > |Y |, or 2. |V | = |Y | and for every link ij ∈ Eg, if i ∈ V ,
then j ∈ Y . Thus, there does not exist a partition {T, V, Y } of N for which
Eg[Y ] = Eg[T, Y ] = ∅ and |V | < |Y |.
Then, there must be a partition {T, V, Y } of N for which Eg[Y ] =
Eg[T, Y ] = ∅ and |V | ≥ |Y | such that the number of components K with
(35.2) odd is greater than (35.3).
For any partition with Eg[Y ] = Eg[T, Y ] = ∅ and |V | > |Y |, the number
of components K with (35.2) odd is always smaller than (35.3) because β is
chosen sufficiently large.
For any partition with Eg[Y ] = Eg[T, Y ] = ∅ and |V | = |Y |, we know
that for every link ij ∈ Eg, if i ∈ V , then j ∈ Y . (The reason is that if |U | =
|W (U)|, then for every link ij ∈ Eg with i ∈ U it is true that j ∈ W (U), and
for U = V in this case W (U) = Y .) Then, Eg[V ] = Eg[T, V ] = Eg[T, Y ] = ∅.
This implies that T = ∅. If T were not empty, nodes in T would not be
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connected to either V or Y , and g would not be connected, a contradiction.
From T = ∅, it follows that the number of components K is zero. (35.3) is
also zero. Hence, the number of components K is not greater than (35.3).
Thus, there does not exist any partition {T, V, Y } of N such that the
number of components K with (35.2) odd is greater than (35.3). This is a
contradiction and therefore x must exist. Thus, there also exists a reciprocal
equilibrium t with g(t) = g.
Proof of Proposition 6. Proof of part b).
First, suppose that qt = 1. Then g(t) ∈ GR. The set GR is independent
of T by Proposition 2. Thus g(tˆ) ∈ GˆR and qˆt = 1. By Proposition 1,
f ′(tbb) = av1(1, 1). Thus, tbb is independent of T and therefore, tbb = tˆbb.
Second, suppose that qt > 1. Then, g(t) = g(tˆ) /∈ GR = GˆR and thus qˆt >
1. By Proposition 3, the bipartition of g(t) is unique, and therefore |C||D| =
|Cˆ|
|Dˆ| .
By Proposition 1 and 3: i) f ′(tˆcc) = av1(qˆt, 1), ii) f ′(tˆdd) = av1( 1qˆt , 1), and
iii) |C||D| = qˆ
t Tˆ−tˆdd
Tˆ−tˆcc . The analogous conditions hold for t. Applying the implicit
function theorem to the equation |C||D| = q
t T−tdd
T−tcc , we get:
∂qt
∂T
= −
(T−σ(qt))−(T−σ( 1
qt
))
(T−σ(qt))2
T−σ( 1
qt
)
T−σ(qt) + q
t
σ′( 1
qt
) 1
qt2
(T−σ(qt))+(T−σ( 1
qt
))σ′(qt)
(T−σ(qt))2
.
It is straightforward to show – keeping in mind that σ is strictly increasing
– that the numerator is negative and the denominator positive and therefore
∂qt
∂T
> 0.
Thus, qˆt > qt, tˆcc > tcc by (i) and tˆdd < tdd by (ii). Hence Tˆ− tˆdd > T−tdd.
From qˆt > qt, it follows that
Tˆ − tˆcc
Tˆ − tˆdd
>
T − tcc
T − tdd
and therefore Tˆ − tˆcc > T − tcc.
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